| Pages:
1
2
3 |
IrC
International Hazard
Posts: 2710
Registered: 7-3-2005
Location: Eureka
Member Is Offline
Mood: Discovering
|
|
The Responsibility of Scientists as fellow Human Beings
At what point should anyone endeavoring to make new discoveries in science just say no? What responsibility should be implied upon any form of
scientific research?
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/alarm-as-dutch-lab...
http://www.jsonline.com/news/wisconsin/uw-bird-flu-research-...
Already stores of seed are saved in arctic locations in the event of genetic engineering causing global crop and other plant life destruction. When is
enough enough? Is there no point at which scientists should be considered criminals committing crimes against humanity?
I will go ahead and post the text since I hate those threads based upon vanishing links.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alarm as Dutch lab creates highly contagious killer flu
Fear of terrorism as university prepares to publish key details
A deadly strain of bird flu with the potential to infect and kill millions of people has been created in a laboratory by European scientists – who
now want to publish full details of how they did it.
The discovery has prompted fears within the US Government that the knowledge will fall into the hands of terrorists wanting to use it as a bio-weapon
of mass destruction.
Some scientists are questioning whether the research should ever have been undertaken in a university laboratory, instead of at a military facility.
The US Government is now taking advice on whether the information is too dangerous to be published.
To see the graphic: The last outbreak - A deadly virus even before the latest twist
"The fear is that if you create something this deadly and it goes into a global pandemic, the mortality and cost to the world could be massive," a
senior scientific adviser to the US Government told The Independent, speaking on condition of anonymity.
"The worst-case scenario here is worse than anything you can imagine."
For the first time the researchers have been able to mutate the H5N1 strain of avian influenza so that it can be transmitted easily through the air in
coughs and sneezes. Until now, it was thought that H5N1 bird flu could only be transmitted between humans via very close physical contact.
Dutch scientists carried out the controversial research to discover how easy it was to genetically mutate H5N1 into a highly infectious "airborne"
strain of human flu. They believe that the knowledge gained will be vital for the development of new vaccines and drugs.
But critics say the scientists have endangered the world by creating a highly dangerous form of flu which could escape from the laboratory – as well
as opening a Pandora's box for fanatical terrorists wishing to make a bio-weapon.
The H5N1 strain of avian influenza has killed hundreds of millions of birds since it first appeared in 1996, but has so far infected only about 600
people who came into direct contact with infected poultry.
What makes H5N1 so dangerous, though, is that it has killed about 60 per cent of those it has infected, making it one of the most lethal known forms
of influenza in modern history – a deadliness moderated only by its inability (so far) to spread easily through airborne water droplets.
Scientists are in little doubt that the newly created strain of H5N1 – resulting from just five mutations in two key genes – has the potential to
cause a devastating human pandemic that could kill tens of millions of people. The study was carried out on ferrets, which when infected with
influenza are the best animal "model" of the human disease.
The details of the study are so sensitive that they are being scrutinised by the US Government's own National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity,
which is understood to have advised American officials that key parts of the scientific paper should be redacted to prevent terrorists from using the
information to reverse-engineer their own lethal strain of flu virus.
In an unprecedented move, the Biosecurity board is believed to have told the US Government that there is a serious possibility of potentially
dangerous information being misused if the full genetic sequence of the mutated H5N1 virus were to be published in open scientific literature.
A senior source close to the Biosecurity board, who wished to remain anonymous, told The Independent that the National Institutes of Health, which
funded the work, is about to make a decision on how much of the scientific paper on the H5N1 super strain should be published, and how much held back.
"There are areas of science where information needs to be controlled," the scientist said. "The most extreme examples are, for instance, how to make a
nuclear weapon or any weapon that is going to be used primarily to kill people. The life sciences really haven't encountered this situation before.
It's really a new age."
The study was carried out by a Dutch team of scientists led by Ron Fouchier of the Erasmus Medical Centre in Rotterdam, where the mutated virus is
stored under lock and key, but without armed guards, in a basement building.
Dr Fouchier, who declined to answer questions until a decision is made on publication, said in a statement released on the university's website that
it only took a small number of mutations to change the avian flu virus into a form that could spread more easily between humans.
"We have discovered that this is indeed possible, and more easily than previously thought. In the laboratory, it was possible to change H5N1 into an
aerosol-transmissible virus that can easily be rapidly spread through the air," Dr Fouchier said. "This process could also take place in a natural
setting.
"We know which mutation to watch for in the case of an outbreak and we can then stop the outbreak before it is too late. Furthermore, the finding will
help in the timely development of vaccinations and medication."
A second, independent team of researchers led by Yoshihiro Kawaoka of the universities of Wisconsin and Tokyo is understood to have carried out
similar work with similar results, which has underlined how easy it is to create the super virus with a combination of deliberate mutations and random
genetic changes brought about by passing avian flu manually from the nose of one ferret to another.
Some scientists have privately questioned whether such research should have been done in a university department that does not have the sophisticated
anti-terrorist security of a military facility. They also point out that experimental viruses kept in seemingly secure laboratories have escaped in
the past to cause human epidemics – such as a 1977 flu outbreak.
"There are people who say that the work should never have been done, or if it was done it should have been done in a setting where the information
could be better controlled," said the source close to the biosecurity board.
"With influenza now it is possible to reverse engineer the virus. It's pretty common technology in many parts of the world. With the genomic sequence,
you can reconstruct it. That's where the information is dangerous," he said.
"It's scary from a number of different angles. You want to have the vaccines and therapeutics in place, and you need to have a much information as you
can about a particular virus, but you also worry about it from a biosecurity perspective."
Profile: researcher behind the science
Ron Fouchier
The Dutch virologist started as an expert in HIV, having received his PhD from the University of Amsterdam in 1995. After research at the University
of Pennsylvania School of Medicine, he began a new career in the virology department at Erasmus Medical Centre in Rotterdam, studying the molecular
biology of the influenza A virus.
At a conference in Malta in September, he described his work as something that was "really, really stupid," but ultimately useful for the development
of vaccines.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
UW bird flu research seen as bioterror threat
Dec. 16, 2011
A University of Wisconsin-Madison scientist who is an expert on the avian flu virus is under scrutiny because of concerns his new research may fall
into the wrong hands.
The scientist is Yoshihiro Kawaoka, an eminent professor of virology in the School of Veterinary Medicine who has done research on H5N1, also known as
the avian bird flu. His work and similar research independently done by a Dutch scientist have raised concerns in science journals and on an NBC News
report that aired Thursday night that touched on such controversial issues as bioterrorism and scientific freedom.
Kawaoka has created a contagion virus in his lab, a UW official confirmed. But the official said he couldn't discuss the nature of the virus because
it would compromise the publication of Kawaoka's research.
A Science magazine report detailing the work done by Dutch scientist Ron Fouchier of the Erasmus Medical Center in the Netherlands reported that
Fouchier had developed a man-made H5N1 avian influenza strain that had been genetically altered and is now easily transmissible between ferrets.
Fouchier reported that studies show that any influenza strain passed among ferrets has also been transmissible among humans and vice versa.
The Science report, which focused on Fouchier's studies, said Kawaoka's research came up with comparable results.
"The research by the Kawaoka and Fouchier teams set out to answer a question that has long puzzled scientists. Does H5N1, which rarely causes human
disease, have the potential to trigger a pandemic?" the magazine reported.
In response, UW spokesman Terry Devitt said Science magazine had not seen Kawaoka's research. "Equating the two . . . is a
mistake," Devitt said in an email.
Devitt said Kawaoka's work was no longer under review by the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity. That board provides advice to the
National Institutes for Health regarding research that may pose a threat to public health and/or national security.
The board "made recommendations regarding the contents of the manuscript, and those recommendations will be respected as we work with the journal,"
Devitt said.
A spokesman for the advisory board was not available for comment.
Security defended
Interim UW Chancellor David Ward said he had been briefed about Kawaoka's research about a month ago and said he was confident that the level of
security involving Kawaoka's research was adequate.
"In general, I am very comfortable with the way the university has created security around this. . . . We do deserve questions from
the public about the fact that this could potentially, you know, be a problem. But the people doing the research were conscious of this right from the
start, evaluated the trade-offs, and I think my conclusion was there is really no public threat with what has happened."
Ward added that he supported the publication of Kawaoka's findings.
Devitt added that the H5N1 virus had been studied on campus and elsewhere for years. He said it would be inaccurate to describe H5N1 as a pandemic
virus.
"We have comprehensive and stringent biosafety and biosecurity measures in place," Devitt said. "Those measures are constantly reviewed and updated.
Also, the university is subject to federal oversight of work with this and other agents, including unannounced inspections."
Warning made
Nevertheless, the leaders of the Center for Biosecurity at the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center raised questions about the research.
"We are playing with fire," said an editorial published online Thursday by the center.
The editorial warned that researchers went too far when they genetically engineered an avian flu strain that could be spread quickly among humans.
"There are no guarantees that such a deadly strain of avian flu would not escape accidentally from the laboratory," said the editorial in the
peer-reviewed journal, Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science.
The article was written in response to the Dutch research, but it also applies to avian flu research at UW, a spokeswoman for the Center for
Biosecurity said Friday.
The Dutch experiment was performed by internationally respected scientists in biosafety conditions considered top of the line, the editorial noted.
"The risk of a person accidentally becoming infected and starting an outbreak with this strain is low. But it is not zero," it said.
An accidental escape of an influenza strain from a lab in 1977 led to widespread flu epidemics, the editorial says. "Given the potential global
consequences of an accident with the newly modified strain of avian flu, we are playing with fire."
The Center for Biosecurity said in its editorial that it didn't oppose research in high-containment labs using dangerous pathogens, including H5N1,
but research to develop diagnostics, medicines and vaccines for the most-threatening infectious diseases does not require engineering lethal viruses
to make them more transmissible between humans.
A critical tenet of the advancement of science is the publication of new research in a form that allows other scientists to reproduce the work, the
editorial notes, adding: "This principle should be followed in almost all conceivable circumstances. But in this circumstance, it shouldn't.
"Publishing the methods for transforming the H5N1 virus into a highly transmissible strain would show other scientists around the world how to do it
in their own labs," it continued. "One concern is the possibility that the strain would be recreated for malevolent purposes. Even disregarding this
risk (which we shouldn't), scientific publication would encourage others that this is a research initiative worthy of additional exploration.
. . . Whether this experiment is published or not, it is a reminder of the power of biology and its potential. We need new approaches for
the rapid development of large quantities of medicines or vaccines to protect us against new emerging viruses. But engineering highly transmissible
strains of avian flu is not the way to get us there."
Devitt added that officials feel publishing Kawaoka's work won't pose a risk beyond what is already known about influenza viruses.
"For example, the genome of the 1918 flu virus, which is far more pathogenic than the virus in question, is already publicly available," he said.
Devitt said Kawaoka's research and the work of other scientists is the best defense against a virus that could become pandemic in nature.
"Based on a review of the research by the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity and at their recommendation, any publication will be crafted
to minimize the opportunity for misuse," Devitt said.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[Edited on 12-20-2011 by IrC]
"Science is the belief in the ignorance of the experts" Richard Feynman
|
|
|
BromicAcid
International Hazard
Posts: 3253
Registered: 13-7-2003
Location: Wisconsin
Member Is Offline
Mood: Rock n' Roll
|
|
This subject reminds me a lot of the opening lines of HP Lovecraft's - Call of Cthulhu
| Quote: | | The most merciful thing in the world, I think, is the inability of the human mind to correlate all its contents. We live on a placid island of
ignorance in the midst of black seas of infinity, and it was not meant that we should voyage far. The sciences, each straining in its own direction,
have hitherto harmed us little; but some day the piecing together of dissociated knowledge will open up such terrifying vistas of reality, and of our
frightful position therein, that we shall either go mad from the revelation or flee from the light into the peace and safety of a new dark age.
|
Should we call it quits? I'd say no, but at certain times our only hope seems to be being able to come up with solutions as fast as we can come up
with problems. I would think that someone in your example studying basically weponization of a virus should be held accountable, but for what? That
same knowledge could be used for good or bad. It could help delay or stop a pandemic. Still, I have chemical knowledge as I am sure some members of
this forum have, that we know should not be made generally available. Some call it hording, but personally I don't want a resurgence of phossy jaw or
mercury poisoning on my head.
|
|
|
Bot0nist
International Hazard
Posts: 1559
Registered: 15-2-2011
Location: Right behind you.
Member Is Offline
Mood: Streching my cotyledons.
|
|
Scary stuff. Thank you for sharing. The threat of genetically modified "super bugs" has long been a great fear of mine. Much more terrifying than
nuclear weapons. My father used to say cynically, "One day we will invent our selves into extinction. The last words uttered by mankind will be 'It
works!'"
Looks like we have the power to end it all. To little knowledge is a dangerous thing, so is too much, apparently.
U.T.F.S.E. and learn the joys of autodidacticism!
Don't judge each day only by the harvest you reap, but also by the seeds you sow.
|
|
|
IrC
International Hazard
Posts: 2710
Registered: 7-3-2005
Location: Eureka
Member Is Offline
Mood: Discovering
|
|
Time to post the link again. It fits so well.
Epitaph - King Crimson
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zhuG2hCJtsk
King Crimson Epitaph LIVE, while someone still lives to play it on stage.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-Jh49xDNbCg&feature=relat...
I am not saying give up science. Yet this guy wants to publish the information knowing precisely the possible implications? For what? Brownie points
that he did it first, for credit, while the living can still give him his just fame and glory for his 'wonderful brilliance'? If a person has any
moral decency or conscience whatsoever, then they must surely know some lines should never be crossed. If he is so smart is he unable to read the
news, to be aware of a world filled with terrorists just waiting for the ultimate weapon?
Using the excuse he can make vaccines is total crap. If this were true he would not want to publish the virus research knowing how long it would take
to create the vaccine and manufacture and distribute enough globally so that his work could not possibly result in a single innocent to suffer and/or
die. He would keep the work secret and if ever publicized it would be after there was a cure available everywhere. If a single soul dies the blood is
on his (their) hands.
I should add the words to the song:
The wall on which the prophets wrote Is cracking at the seams
Upon the instruments of death The sunlight brightly gleams
When every man is torn apart With nightmares and with dreams
Will no one lay the laurel wreath When silence drowns the screams?
Confusion will be my epitaph As I crawl a cracked and broken path
If we make it we can all sit back and laugh
But I fear tomorrow I'll be crying
Yes, I fear tomorrow I'll be crying
Between the iron gates of fate The seeds of time were sown
And watered by the deeds of those Who know and who are known
Knowledge is a deadly friend When no one sets the rules
The fate of all mankind I see Is in the hands of fools
Confusion will be my epitaph
As I crawl a cracked and broken path
If we make it we can all sit back and laugh
But I fear tomorrow I'll be crying
Yes, I fear tomorrow I'll be crying
[Edited on 12-20-2011 by IrC]
"Science is the belief in the ignorance of the experts" Richard Feynman
|
|
|
gregxy
Hazard to Others
Posts: 421
Registered: 26-5-2006
Member Is Offline
Mood: No Mood
|
|
I think it makes sense to do the research in a secure location for the purpose
of developing a vaccine. But I don't think it makes sense to distribute the
knowledge of how it was done or even that it was done. (just knowing that
something can be done is 1/2 the effort).
Bioweapons are truly terrifying.
Given the economic problems from the rising cost of health and
the fact that our lifespan and "quality of life" are not improving that much any more,
some pretty good arguments could be made that further research in these areas
may do more harm than good.
|
|
|
IrC
International Hazard
Posts: 2710
Registered: 7-3-2005
Location: Eureka
Member Is Offline
Mood: Discovering
|
|
What bothers me is they are smart enough to fully understand this virus could decimate the earth, killing billions. The 1917 and 1957 flu's were
nothing compared to this. Yet knowing it would take a year at best to come up with a vaccine if they were lucky, and much longer to make enough their
first thought is to rush out and publish the information on how to create the disease. While no one has yet started on a cure. Since it also infects
other mammals and mutates over cycles of replication they are in effect working upon the extinction of all life. What is their true goal? For whales
to inherit the earth? While that may sound somewhat dramatic I wonder. Maybe not so much.
It should be stated again:
"An accidental escape of an influenza strain from a lab in 1977 led to widespread flu epidemics, the editorial says. "Given the potential global
consequences of an accident with the newly modified strain of avian flu, we are playing with fire."
The Center for Biosecurity said in its editorial that it didn't oppose research in high-containment labs using dangerous pathogens, including H5N1,
but research to develop diagnostics, medicines and vaccines for the most-threatening infectious diseases does
not require engineering lethal viruses to make them more transmissible between humans.
A critical tenet of the advancement of science is the publication of new research in a form that allows other scientists to reproduce the work, the
editorial notes, adding: "This principle should be followed in almost all conceivable circumstances. But in this circumstance, it shouldn't.
"Publishing the methods for transforming the H5N1 virus into a highly transmissible strain would show other scientists around the world how to do it
in their own labs," it continued. "One concern is the possibility that the strain would be recreated for malevolent purposes. Even disregarding this
risk (which we shouldn't), scientific publication would encourage others that this is a research initiative worthy of additional exploration."
[Edited on 12-20-2011 by IrC]
"Science is the belief in the ignorance of the experts" Richard Feynman
|
|
|
hissingnoise
International Hazard
Posts: 3940
Registered: 26-12-2002
Member Is Offline
Mood: Pulverulescent!
|
|
I haven't had time to plough through the verbiage but it seems fairly obvious to me that to attempt to impose restrictions on scientific inquiry
because of man's intrinsic stupidity is itself, the very height of stupidity!
I mean, what the fuck could be worse than a censorship of knowledge???
[Edited on 20-12-2011 by hissingnoise]
|
|
|
fledarmus
Hazard to Others
Posts: 187
Registered: 23-6-2011
Member Is Offline
Mood: No Mood
|
|
Yeah, if that first cave man had never shown anybody his idea about sharpening up his stones before hitting animals with them, we would have been much
better off today. He should have realized that somebody could have used his sharpened stone idea to hit another person instead, and touched off an
arms race we still haven't reached the end of.
And fire - whose idea was that? Deliberately poisoning our atmosphere with CO2!
|
|
|
Rosco Bodine
Banned
Posts: 6370
Registered: 29-9-2004
Member Is Offline
Mood: analytical
|
|
Small children with loaded firearms .......
Let's responsibly at least wait until they are five or six years old and have some BB gun experience having shown some aptitude 
|
|
|
Polverone
Now celebrating 21 years of madness
Posts: 3186
Registered: 19-5-2002
Location: The Sunny Pacific Northwest
Member Is Offline
Mood: Waiting for spring
|
|
If every kind of scientific inquiry had the same beneficial effects on human comfort as the discovery of fire or hunting tools then I would agree it's
absurd to refuse to investigate some things. But other kinds of scientific inquiry seem to have no corresponding big benefit to counter their obvious
risks. The development of thermonuclear explosives, nerve gases, and engineered plagues seem to fall in that realm.
Research on offensive chemical and biological warfare has often taken place under cover of developing new defenses. Further, even if the program
operators genuinely reject offensive use, it was less than a decade ago that someone inside the US bioweapons program stole anthrax spores and used
them for terror. It only takes one trusted yet deranged person with access to super-plague to unleash catastrophe. If it is important for defensive
purposes to test different factors governing lethality, communicability, etc. then it seems this should be done one factor at a time so that there's
never a complete super-plague sitting in the lab or the literature, waiting for some fool or madman.
PGP Key and corresponding e-mail address
|
|
|
Adas
National Hazard
Posts: 711
Registered: 21-9-2011
Location: Slovakia
Member Is Offline
Mood: Sensitive to shock and friction
|
|
I will never understand why the hell they make viruses, that can kill millions? I'd rather make some harmless bacteria making useful compounds like
bio-fuel and so. I think, making viruses is absolutely pointless and dangerous.
Rest In Pieces!
|
|
|
fledarmus
Hazard to Others
Posts: 187
Registered: 23-6-2011
Member Is Offline
Mood: No Mood
|
|
Quote: Originally posted by Polverone  | If every kind of scientific inquiry had the same beneficial effects on human comfort as the discovery of fire or hunting tools then I would agree it's
absurd to refuse to investigate some things. But other kinds of scientific inquiry seem to have no corresponding big benefit to counter their obvious
risks.
|
Unfortunately, that is an ex post facto analysis. Put yourself in their place - if your only experience with fire had been forest or grass fires, what
would you have thought about your cave mate actually trying to make some in your cave? Would you have thought, "oh, what a wonderful idea, I always
feel so warm when I am downwind of a large grass fire, I can't wait to feel like that in my own cave!" or would you have thought, "oh, hell no! Right
now we only have to worry about fire when there's been a lot of lightning after some really dry weather, and it devastates the entire landscape and
drives off all the game when it comes, and you want to try to MAKE it?!?"
As for the viruses, studying the mechanisms of viral infection have proven very useful in developing gene transfer technologies, allowing us to study
effects of specific genes on cells and organisms as well as using cells as factories for producing biological products. And in response to the
argument that there is no defensive reason for studying how to make viruses more infective, let me ask a question - how would you study how vulnerable
your computer is to a viral attack? You do it by trying to design viruses that will attack it, identifying the weak points, and doing something about
them.
|
|
|
Polverone
Now celebrating 21 years of madness
Posts: 3186
Registered: 19-5-2002
Location: The Sunny Pacific Northwest
Member Is Offline
Mood: Waiting for spring
|
|
| Quote: Originally posted by fledarmus |
As for the viruses, studying the mechanisms of viral infection have proven very useful in developing gene transfer technologies, allowing us to study
effects of specific genes on cells and organisms as well as using cells as factories for producing biological products. And in response to the
argument that there is no defensive reason for studying how to make viruses more infective, let me ask a question - how would you study how vulnerable
your computer is to a viral attack? You do it by trying to design viruses that will attack it, identifying the weak points, and doing something about
them. |
Please don't address a straw-man argument that I never made. I have no objection to studying viruses in general. I do have objections to making
super-plagues in the lab. Engineering some relatively benign virus to increase its communicability should have been a sufficient proof-of-concept
without the risk that by accident or insanity real super-plague gets loose.
Humans are not easily redesigned, so making more and more lethal things in hopes that humans will become less and less killable is foolish. That's
actually not even how secure computer systems are designed.
PGP Key and corresponding e-mail address
|
|
|
fledarmus
Hazard to Others
Posts: 187
Registered: 23-6-2011
Member Is Offline
Mood: No Mood
|
|
I call your attention to:
Security vulnerability in printers
Hacks that corrupt batteries
It sounds to my like researchers are designing ways to hack systems in order to find ways to defend against them...
|
|
|
hissingnoise
International Hazard
Posts: 3940
Registered: 26-12-2002
Member Is Offline
Mood: Pulverulescent!
|
|
| Quote: Originally posted by Polverone | | I would agree it's absurd to refuse to investigate some things. But other kinds of scientific inquiry seem to have no corresponding big benefit to
counter their obvious risks. The development of thermonuclear explosives, nerve gases, and engineered plagues seem to fall in that realm.
|
The 'Mexican standoff' we call the 'Cold War' couldn't have existed without nuclear arsenals and the study of nerve agents is making
contributions in some important areas in the bio-sciences.
And who can say what potential the modification of viruses may eventually have for research in immunology?
Don't forget that nuclear fusion may, one day, replace all our existing energy-production systems!
There is no such thing as valueless scientific research . . .
|
|
|
Polverone
Now celebrating 21 years of madness
Posts: 3186
Registered: 19-5-2002
Location: The Sunny Pacific Northwest
Member Is Offline
Mood: Waiting for spring
|
|
| Quote: Originally posted by hissingnoise | | Quote: Originally posted by Polverone | | I would agree it's absurd to refuse to investigate some things. But other kinds of scientific inquiry seem to have no corresponding big benefit to
counter their obvious risks. The development of thermonuclear explosives, nerve gases, and engineered plagues seem to fall in that realm.
|
The 'Mexican standoff' we call the 'Cold War' couldn't have existed without nuclear arsenals and the study of nerve agents is making
contributions in some important areas in the bio-sciences.
And who can say what potential the modification of viruses may eventually have for research in immunology?
Don't forget that nuclear fusion may, one day, replace all our existing energy-production systems!
There is no such thing as valueless scientific research . . .
|
I was very careful how I phrased my objections. I'll buy a hat and then eat it if immunology researchers find this engineered super-plague a useful
tool.
I believe that fission weapons are/were destructive enough to deter rational actors from war. Somebody crazy enough to start a nuclear war doesn't
seem likely to be deterred by raising the stakes to thermonuclear war, and if deterrence fails the consequences are substantially worse. Peaceful
fusion programs can yield militarily useful information but the reverse is not true: a commitment to developing thermonuclear weapons does not advance
the quest for peaceful thermonuclear energy.
The weaponization of nerve gases, and the development of deadlier agents after WW II, has very little relevance to biochemical research. The
parameters sought and optimized by military forces are irrelevant to or even contrary to the parameters useful to biochemical researchers. What
biochemist optimizes reagents for deadliness, persistence, multi-ton production, and ability to thwart battlefield countermeasures? The development of
the G-agent series after tabun, and the later V-agent series, was useful to 3 small groups:
1) Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war.
2) The people who earned a livelihood manufacturing nerve gases and associated products.
3) The people who later earned a livelihood destroying the output of group 2.
2 and 3 are like a jobs program of digging and refilling holes only with more potential for dangerous mishaps.
| Quote: | I call your attention to:
Security vulnerability in printers
Hacks that corrupt batteries
It sounds to my like researchers are designing ways to hack systems in order to find ways to defend against them...
|
You'll notice that the researchers did not (e.g.) actually release code to steal information via the printer vulnerability, even though their research
showed it was possible. This is akin to the difference between showing that it is possible to make a relatively harmless human virus more contagious
through engineering vs. demonstrating enhanced contagion with a deadly virus.
Further, I wouldn't even say that researchers are developing hacks to discover how to defend against them. The kind of problems they found are
well-known, just affecting yet another group of products. The remedies require no new developments in computer security. The hacks are more to prod
companies into doing something about product problems that could have been identified and solved before they ever hit store shelves (but weren't,
because the economic incentives weren't there).
PGP Key and corresponding e-mail address
|
|
|
AndersHoveland
Hazard to Other Members, due to repeated speculation and posting of untested highly dangerous procedures!
Posts: 1986
Registered: 2-3-2011
Member Is Offline
Mood: No Mood
|
|
I really think the idea of "scientific ethics" is overrated. The main hindrance to the progression in science seems to be funding, rather than the
limits of human ingenuity. If a scientist objects to doing unethical research, there will always be someone else to take his place. What I mean is
that the abstinance of an individual, or even group of scientists, from engaging in research will in no way hinder the objectionable research.
I think ethical considerations in science actually are, in practice, only personal ethical considerations. There are very few nuclear
scientists (many of whom are unemployed) who would decline an excellent job offer, even if it was in a controversial country with a poor human rights
record, run by an evil dictator with ambitions for foreign conquest.
|
|
|
IrC
International Hazard
Posts: 2710
Registered: 7-3-2005
Location: Eureka
Member Is Offline
Mood: Discovering
|
|
I think AH I am unable to follow your reasoning as it applies to individual responsibility. A poor outlook on humanity but I suppose realistic as much
as I hate to think so. However I do not know if you would find western scientists who needing cash would help a terrorist entity develop weapons of
mass destruction. I actually met an unemployed NW designer once, he was driving a truck. Seems most places he looked said he was over credentialed for
them, I assume not wanting to hire someone with his pay grade. There he was doing a lower job to keep bills paid with no thought whatsoever of aiding
some third world dictator. Are you saying if you did not rob banks someone else would so why not you? Or do I read that wrong? It sounds like 'why
should we have morals as long as there will always be someone else who does not'. Not implying anything about you, you made the statement so I am
using you as my example. The way I see it if someone would involve themselves in such an endeavor it is because they had already demonized their
'target' in their own mind. I have no doubt there are also those who have no conscience and would target their own family for profit. Sad but most
likely true. However this is not on the point I was making previously, that is they did not need to weaponize the flu to develop cures. I repeat the
statement by someone very much in the forefront of bio research:
"research to develop diagnostics, medicines and vaccines for the most-threatening infectious diseases does not require engineering lethal
viruses to make them more transmissible between humans".
How many times does it need to be said you can cure a virus without the need to weaponize it. Making Avian flu dangerously contagious so that it can
spread more easily serves no purpose other than as a weapon period.
There is strong evidence that many of the bad flues which have injured and killed countless thousands in the last 60 years were caused by researchers
in the field. However I have yet to see a cure for either the flu or even the common cold. So to all the defenders of unimpeded bio research my
question is what good have they done so far and at what cost?
"Science is the belief in the ignorance of the experts" Richard Feynman
|
|
|
Bot0nist
International Hazard
Posts: 1559
Registered: 15-2-2011
Location: Right behind you.
Member Is Offline
Mood: Streching my cotyledons.
|
|
| Quote: Originally posted by IrC | There is strong evidence that many of the bad flues which have injured and killed countless thousands in the last 60 years were caused by
researchers in the field.
|
Can you point me to where you read that please. I am very interested.
U.T.F.S.E. and learn the joys of autodidacticism!
Don't judge each day only by the harvest you reap, but also by the seeds you sow.
|
|
|
IrC
International Hazard
Posts: 2710
Registered: 7-3-2005
Location: Eureka
Member Is Offline
Mood: Discovering
|
|
It would take endless hours of research to go back and find all the documentation I had read over the last few years. One piece of information is in
the articles I started this thread with. I guess you did not read them completely but:
"An accidental escape of an influenza strain from a lab in 1977 proves the possibility: That accident led to widespread flu epidemics. Given the
potential global consequences of an accident with the newly modified strain of avian flu, we are playing with fire." From:
http://www.upmc-biosecurity.org/website/resources/publicatio...
The point about suffering and death I added simply because through experience I know this is what widespread flu outbreaks do. The weak; elderly,
young, and in between age health compromised die in large numbers. About 11 years ago I was in New Mexico and there were many deaths of the elderly
from a very bad flu going around at the time. I caught it and it was a worse than average one from past experience. I had one friend about 45 years
old in much better average health than me miss two weeks of work he was so sick. In short most flues are far more deadly than many give them credit
for. This we know from news and statistics. Simply a matter of researching past history. As to other flues yes I have read many reports on this
subject from many locations such as the Center for Biosecurity of UPMC, and many similar entities. If you doubt this do the research and study the
casualty statistics from various flu outbreaks.
Perhaps if I have time I will go find a few more links to add on this but right now I am trying to get a program for a Pic16F877 in a little robot
brain I am working on to function correctly and 12AX7 is never around when I need him to do my work for me.
My problem is in still having trouble relating machine cycles to real world timing events such as reading sonar pulses. As fate would have it I never
have a chainsaw around when I need one.
Going further I should add mortality rate is a very important factor. If you read the text below from the link (just above) you will see that it was
only 2 percent for the 1918 pandemic, killing millions. Look closely at that number for this now weaponized avian flu and carefully think about the
possible outcome.
"Over the past 8 years, H5N1 avian influenza has sickened 571 people, killing 59% of them. To give some perspective, the fatality rate of the virus
that caused the 1918 Great Pandemic was 2%, and that pandemic killed on the order of 50 million people."
Is there really any more I can say or are the numbers very clear? I could add this. I caught that late 70's flu and it nearly took me out, making me
wish it had at the time. I remember it quite clearly. Others did die. Yet to this day no one has cured the flu so what was gained. I also remember
equally clearly the widespread propaganda from Uncle Gestapo about how we J.Q. public must hurry in and get the flu shot. Which I refused to do being
the untrusting soul I am. Good thing since years later the stats on how many people were paralyzed for life and or otherwise injured from getting the
vaccine started showing up in various publications. I guarantee you the government was not making this known at the time.
[Edited on 12-21-2011 by IrC]
"Science is the belief in the ignorance of the experts" Richard Feynman
|
|
|
IrC
International Hazard
Posts: 2710
Registered: 7-3-2005
Location: Eureka
Member Is Offline
Mood: Discovering
|
|
A.H., I really intended this to be a serious discussion and with all the 'Jews are taking over the world links' on the page you just gave us I can see
an honest discussion is not your intention. Please go watch a few more outer limits reruns and get back to us if you have something of value to add.
Bringing up the 1977 flu outbreak and it's likely cause was not a conspiracy nut act on my part, this is supported by the opinion of many in high
positions among the most well credentialed bio research entities on the planet.
I cannot say if you are being serious with the information on the page itself nor if the information therein is of value scientifically yet the links
at the bottom tend to leave me with suspicion of it's value. The link titles speak for themselves.
Related La Voz de Aztlan articles:
The Israelization of the USA and its Dangers to Mexico
Zionist Plot to Take Over the Mexican Presidency
Zionist Terrorists Arrested Inside Mexican Congress
Mexican Attorney General Releases Zionist Terrorists
Mexico condemns Israel over genocide in Gaza
To post below: OK I can see the possibility but your removal of that post makes me appear to be a little deranged making this post. Oh well, I can
live with that.
Just so I do not look completely nuts this was the link you posted.
http://www.aztlan.net/mexicans_are_now_endangered.htm
I no longer look at all things as being from outer space since in the last couple of decades today's science fiction becomes tomorrows science facts
fairly often. Picard was using an Ipad in the 90's. I always thought Jobs was a scifi nut and wonder if he did get the idea from the show.
[Edited on 12-21-2011 by IrC]
"Science is the belief in the ignorance of the experts" Richard Feynman
|
|
|
AndersHoveland
Hazard to Other Members, due to repeated speculation and posting of untested highly dangerous procedures!
Posts: 1986
Registered: 2-3-2011
Member Is Offline
Mood: No Mood
|
|
Seriousness was obviously not intended, but it did suggest the intriguing possibility of genetically-programmed infectious diseases designed to target
a specific group of people.
|
|
|
Bot0nist
International Hazard
Posts: 1559
Registered: 15-2-2011
Location: Right behind you.
Member Is Offline
Mood: Streching my cotyledons.
|
|
IRC, thanks. I wasn't implying that you were making outlandish claims and demanding source. I was just very interested in some of the information you
provided and was curious if you had more on hand. I am not prone to flights of fancy or conspiracy theories, but the tampering with of plagues could
have some serious realistic implications.
As a side note, both me and my brother where hospitalized in the mid 1990s with influenza. Worst experience if our lives. I really thought we would
die.
U.T.F.S.E. and learn the joys of autodidacticism!
Don't judge each day only by the harvest you reap, but also by the seeds you sow.
|
|
|
fledarmus
Hazard to Others
Posts: 187
Registered: 23-6-2011
Member Is Offline
Mood: No Mood
|
|
@ Polverone - I was also very careful about how I phrased my comments. I have not yet commented about the perils of publishing all research, only the
issue of refusing to allow the research to exist.
| Quote: |
You'll notice that the researchers did not (e.g.) actually release code to steal information via the printer vulnerability, even though their research
showed it was possible. This is akin to the difference between showing that it is possible to make a relatively harmless human virus more contagious
through engineering vs. demonstrating enhanced contagion with a deadly virus.
|
No, your A does not equal your B. They are not akin. The researchers not actually releasing the code even though their research showed it was possible
is akin to the viral researching demonstrating enhanced contagion without releasing the technique. The battery researchers were able to turn 7
computers into bricks, which was a demonstration that their technique for killing computers worked. The virus researchers were able to demonstrate
enhanced contagion by making particular modifications in the virus, thus proving the technique for increasing transmission worked.
| Quote: |
Further, I wouldn't even say that researchers are developing hacks to discover how to defend against them. The kind of problems they found are
well-known, just affecting yet another group of products. The remedies require no new developments in computer security. The hacks are more to prod
companies into doing something about product problems that could have been identified and solved before they ever hit store shelves (but weren't,
because the economic incentives weren't there).
|
I'm not sure I am following your logic here. Are you saying that there is no research into finding weaknesses in computer systems? Or that nobody is
developing new ways of attacking computers for the specific purpose of trying to defend against those attacks? Or that the two examples that I gave
were simply publicity stunts designed to draw attention to a weakness that was obvious to these two researchers but that wasn't seen as a threat
sufficient to defend against?
Personally, I find that the knowledge that one research group can enhance the transmissibility of a virus to be strong economic incentive to research
into ways to prevent viral transmission. I also believe that the specific modifications they made, if carefully studied, would lead to a large
increase in the understanding of the mechanisms of viral transmission, and in particular to the differences in pathogenesis among viruses, with
possible public health consequences in recognizing when and to what level specific viral infections need to be treated.
As a culture, I think we have gone over the edge on risk analysis and prevention - insurance companies, massive liability lawsuits for failing to
forsee possible threats, and our attempts to build a bubble-wrapped world that couldn't possibly hurt anyone have gone too far. But refusing to allow
research on something which could be the next big threat is like walking across an interstate blindfolded. You have to know the likelihood of a
potential threat as well as the possible consequences of that threat before you can do anything about reducing its likelihood.
As I indicated earlier, I am concerned with the negative consequences of cutting off research in particular areas before we even know what can be
learned. The issue of whether such results should be disseminated, how broadly, and with what restrictions, is a much more difficult and thorny field.
|
|
|
Rosco Bodine
Banned
Posts: 6370
Registered: 29-9-2004
Member Is Offline
Mood: analytical
|
|
When professional ethics conflicts with personal ethics, honorable men resign. They do not continue, "just following orders" or "just doing their job"
in any form or fashion. There really is no secular guidance for the conscience as to what is wisdom more definitive than the following quote from good
authority.
| Quote: |
For what is a man profited, if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul? or what shall a man give in exchange for his soul? Matthew
16:26, words of Jesus Christ |
Of course it can be recognized a prerequisite and premise for understanding the wisdom of this truth necessarily resides in any person's belief that
the person actually has a soul, and those who do not believe they have a soul to lose will sell cheaply that in which they place no value. Here is
found really a fundamental of morality, and a fundamental of amorality. It also reveals why any secular ethics are simply rationalizations of men
which may or may not be valid, and become the basis of a man invented religion amended whenever need arises as a situational ethic having no absolutes
other than being absolutely presumptuous that man decides what is right for man, rather than that God declares what is the law. For clarity and
precision, this is one matter of serious business where there is no ambiguity, either a person gets it right or they get it wrong. There is no gray
area or middle ground whatever.
|
|
|
| Pages:
1
2
3 |
![[*]](images/xpblue/default_icon.gif){kind=icon}
