| OSTI Document ID | 350848 |
|---|---|
| Local PDF | osti/350848.pdf |
| Title | Global plutonium management: A security option |
| Creators/ Authors |
Sylvester, K.W.B. |
| Publication Date | 1998 Dec 31 |
| Description/ Abstract |
The US surplus plutonium disposition program was created to reduce the proliferation risk posed by the fissile material from thousands of retired nuclear weapons. The Department of Energy has decided to process its Put into a form as secure as Pu in civilian spent fuel. While implementation issues have been considered, a major one (Russian reciprocity) remains unresolved. Russia has made disposition action conditional on extracting the fuel value of its Pu but lacks the infrastructure to do so. Assistance in the construction of the required facilities would conflict with official US policy opposing the development of a Pu fuel cycle. The resulting stagnation provides impetus for a reevaluation of US nonproliferation objectives and Pu disposition options. A strategy for satisfying Russian fuel value concerns and reducing the proliferation risk posed by surplus weapons-grade plutonium (WGPu) is proposed. The effectiveness of material alteration (e.g., isotopic, chemical, etc.{hor_ellipsis}) at reducing the desire, ability and opportunity for proliferation is assessed. Virtually all the security benefits attainable by material processing can be obtained by immobilizing Pu in large unit size/mass monoliths without a radiation barrier. Russia would be allowed to extract the Pu at a future date for use as fuel in a verifiable manner. Remote tracking capability, if proven feasible, would further improve safeguarding capability. As an alternate approach, the US could compensate Russia for its Pu, allowing it to be disposed of or processed elsewhere. A market based method for pricing Pu is proposed. Surplus Pu could represent access to nuclear fuel at a fixed price at a future date. This position can be replicated in the uranium market and priced using derivative theory. The proposed strategy attempts to meet nonproliferation objectives by recognizing technical limitations and satisfying political constraints. |
| OSTI ID | 350848 |
| Report Numbers line line docnumall | |
| Other ID Numbers | ON: DE99002605 |
| Document Type | Conference |
| Research Organization | Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States) |
| Sponsor Organization | USDOE, Washington, DC (United States) |
| DOE Contract Numbers | W-7405-ENG-36 |
| Conference | American Political Science Association annual meeting, Boston, MA (United States), 3-6 Sep 1998 |
| Bibliographic Source | LANL |
| Country | United States |
| Language | English |
| Pages/Size | 16 p. |
| System Entry Date | 1999 Jul 06 |
| Subject Category Code | 21 NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS ;05 NUCLEAR FUELS ;45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEFENSE |
| Descriptors | NUCLEAR WEAPONS DISMANTLEMENT; PLUTONIUM; NUCLEAR MATERIALS MANAGEMENT; PLUTONIUM RECYCLE; USA; RUSSIAN FEDERATION; NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY; NUCLEAR FUELS; SOLIDIFICATION; COST |
| Format | Other: PL: |
| Availability | INIS; OSTI as DE99002605 |
| Notes | PBD: [1998] |
| Reference Numbers | SCA: 210802;055002;450200; PA: EDB-99:062032; SN: 99002100982; TVI: 99R21; TRN: AHC29921%%33 |